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Editorial: Transparency, accountability and the privileges of power 
Carol Harlow1 
 
When I first turned my attention to the subject of accountability in the European Union, in a series of 
lectures for the EUI Academy of Law2 at the turn of the century, the term, together with its twin 
‘transparency’, was just becoming common currency and both were steadily gaining recognition (at 
least in the English-speaking world) as significant benchmarks for democratic governance. The 
European Commission took note of this development in the 2001 White Paper on European 
Governance,3 its response to the allegations of incompetence, malpractice and corruption that had 
brought it so low and led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. ‘Accountability’ and 
‘openness’ were singled out, together with effectiveness, participation and coherence, as key 
principles underpinning democracy and the rule of law at every level of government, with special 
relevance to the EU as it sought to move to a more democratic system of governance. Cynics might 
have noticed the limited nature of the Commission’s commitments; openness meant little more than 
an undertaking to ‘actively communicate about what the EU does’ in language that was ‘accessible 
and understandable for the general public’. Accountability required Institutions and Member States 
to ‘explain and take responsibility’ for what they were doing plus a commitment to ‘greater clarity 
and responsibility’ from all those involved in developing and implementing EU policy at whatever 
level. Concrete suggestions for implementation of these assurances were few.  
My somewhat legalistic study highlighted the weakness at Union level of the classical, external 
accountability machinery of parliaments and courts, although in fact the European Parliament was 
beginning to develop what has since become a significant scrutiny capability, building on its powers 
of budgeting and audit to keep an eye on the burgeoning network of agencies and other 
administrative entities that handle Community funds. In this arduous task it was assisted by internal 
Commission reforms, by a new financial regulation that came into force in 2002 and by the European 
Court of Auditors. The Parliament’s scrutiny work was, however, undermined by the limitations on 
its legislative powers and consistently under-valued through the emphasis on so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’. No role for national parliaments had as yet evolved and, as academic commentators 
constantly noted, a very real accountability gap was opening up, which allowed Community actors to 
escape accountability at both levels of the dual-level system. In general, at a time when scholars 
were beginning to talk in terms of ‘multi-level’ and ‘network’ governance’ there was little sign of 
parallel development amongst the specialised accountability actors; it was only gradually that 
national and Union accountability agents such as audit authorities started to come together to 
cooperate as ‘accountability networks’, although the European Network of Ombudsmen was already 
in being. In other instances, progress was hampered by inter-institutional rivalry.   
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Legal accountability to the Court of Justice was more advanced, though as commentators observed, 
it was quick to build a role as a ‘constitution-maker’ and has been described as ‘one of the principal 
engines in the integration process’4. This integrationist mind-set (perhaps a consequence of the 
Court’s mission statement to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties) has caused commentators to doubt the Court’s even-handedness in exercising its 
review functions; the Court is said to often accused of interpreting Treaty powers expansively in 
favour of Union institutions and to look less favourably on member state claims of Union illegality.5 
Commentators have, for example, noted the Court’s preference for ‘light touch review’: the 
standard of ‘manifest error’ that it uses, its deference to Commission discretion in matters of 
economic or scientific expertise, and its refusal to hold the Commission to account for its use, or 
more often non-use, of the infringement process. The Court was, however, exceptional in using the 
preliminary reference procedure (Art 267 TFEU, ex Article 234 TEC) to build working relationships 
with member state courts, laying the foundations for an ‘accountability network’6 that might in time 
operate to fill accountability gaps.7  
 
My short survey noted serious accountability black spots. Despite the commitment to openness, 
policy-making was secretive and opaque. The structural underbelly of the Communities, an 
undergrowth of committees, working groups and other bodies where, although they were nominally 
advisory, real power actually lay, was scarcely visible. Neither the Council nor the Commission 
seemed particularly minded to open the windows and let in the daylight, although a formal 
procedure for accessing documents in the possession of the institutions was for the first time 
passing from soft into hard law as Regulation 1049/2001.8 This Regulation, however, contained 
severe mandatory exceptions to disclosure of information. Problems were greatest in the Second 
and Third Pillars that had been tacked on to the Community structure by the Maastricht Treaty, 
where the reach of both the parliamentary and legal accountability machinery was severely limited. 
The twin Maastricht pillars were, in other words, designed deliberately as barriers against 
accountability. Built up by a secretive network of committees and working groups, bricks were 
added in a piecemeal and apparently random fashion and not until the framework was safely in 
place was the principle of accountability conceded and the principal barriers to possible opposition 
removed. Similar problems began to emerge at a later stage, with the introduction of European 
agencies. 
Fifteen years on, when the EU is mired in a series of crises that absorb all the attention of public and 
press, may seem an inapposite time to question aspects of the EU governance system that are – or 
certainly should be - more routine. Yet these are important questions on which the fate of European 
democracy may depend. Has progress been made in installing procedures to underpin values today 
rated by the public as principles lying at the heart of any system of democratic governance? There 
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are some positive signs. The demolition of the Third Pillar at Lisbon is a clear victory for courts and 
Parliament, the classical accountability partners. There have been too some significant court 
victories. In Kadi,9 the Court of Justice took a stand as the Union’s primary accountability agent by 
assuming the role of ultimate arbiter over the compliance of Union acts with fundamental human 
rights. The two Courts then came together to tighten their grip on the administration by insisting on 
the observance in human rights cases of the due process requirements of notice, access to 
information, reasoned-decision-making and a right to make representations; these were given 
Treaty status at Lisbon in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This manifestation of 
judicial activism was the more remarkable in that the Council was operating inside its normally 
privileged security zone. In Sweden and Turco10 the Court of Justice went rather far in upholding a 
‘citizens’ right’ to access an opinion from the Council’s legal service on the legality of proposed 
legislation, while in Access Info Europe11 the Court upheld the claim of the plaintiff (a civil society 
organisation campaigning for open government) to see Member State proposals for amendments to 
a legislative draft reforming Regulation 1049/2001 on access to institutional documents, which had 
been tabled (significantly) at a Council working party. In both cases, the arguments for the 
institutional needs of ‘frank, objective and comprehensive advice’, the risk of ‘seriously undermining 
the Council’s decision-making process’ and of exposing lawmakers to lobbyists were 
comprehensively rejected in favour of ‘the democratic right of European citizens to scrutinize the 
information which has formed the basis of a legislative act’ as ‘a precondition for the effective 
exercise of their democratic rights’. Access was obtained, however, only long after the process was 
completed. 
These limited victories have to be balanced, however, against the Council’s clear unwillingness to 
enhance and extend the currently limited freedom to access information by reforming the restrictive 
exceptions to openness in Regulation 1049/2001, not to say the greater omission to consecrate a 
‘public right to know’ as a fundamental ‘Citizens’ Right’ in the Charter. When Emily O’Reilly, the 
current European Ombudsman, opened an own initiative investigation into the transparency of the 
‘trialogue’ stage of EU legislation with a view to ‘boosting transparent law-making in the European 
Union’,12 the reaction of the three institutions involved was both disappointing and typical. The 
immediate response from the Council was to contest the European Ombudsman's competence to 
investigate in what it saw as a clearly legislative procedure. The Commission, while also querying 
competence, took the opportunity to reassure Ms O’Reilly that it already had the matter well in 
hand with the negotiation of an inter-institutional agreement on better regulation13 - a typical ‘Calm 
down dear’ reaction that mirrors the Commission response to the three Citizens’ Initiatives listed on 
the Commission website as ‘successful’ though in fact none has actually succeeded. Although the EP 
also queried competence and stressed the need to weigh transparency to the public against the 
necessity for ‘an orderly, reliable, and accountable way of negotiating between the Institutions’, it 
                                                          
9
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.  
10
 Joined Cases C-39/05 and C-52/05 Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I-4723, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374. 
11
 Case C-280/11 Access Info Europe v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671. 
12
 European Ombudsman, ’Press release no. 9/2015’, 28 May 2015, available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/59975/html.bookmark.  
13
 See COM (2015) 216 final, 19 May 2015, available at http://tinyurl.com/z7b6xcv. 
did go so far as to annex to its letter a lengthy explanation and justification of the trialogue 
procedure.14  
   
At a routine administrative level, the patient is somewhat healthier. The managerial ethos of the 
present-day Commission has proceduralized administration in ways that sometimes help to 
reinforce transparency and accountability. Policy development is signalled in road maps that are 
published and easily accessible; new regulation is routinely supported by published impact 
assessments that can be challenged and evaluated; consultation in which the general public is 
encouraged to participate is a routine practice, though we cannot really know how influential it is.15 
The Transparency Initiative16 brought procedures to help expose lobbying and lobbyists, and 
procedures were already in place to open up Commission relationships with civil society. Even if one 
questions the effectiveness of these innovations and regards them to a certain extent as window-
dressing,17 they are stepping stones in the direction of accountability through public participation. 
Again, the personnel, procedures, agendas and minutes of committees are, if not perfectly 
accessible, at least more easily accessed18 and the Commission has recognised the need in principle 
for ‘clear lines of accountability’ in the governance of EU agencies with ‘coherent rules’ for 
evaluation of their performance. In line with ‘modern principles of better regulation’, agencies – like 
the Commission – should ‘consult properly with and provide feedback to stakeholders and organis[e] 
their business in such a way that transparency is assured and that performance can be effectively 
monitored by institutions and stakeholders alike’.19 Further proceduralization of this type could be in 
the pipeline; under the aegis of the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman, an 
Administrative Procedures Act with binding effect at Union level is currently under consideration.20 
 
Praiseworthy though these changes may be, they are micro-changes, which do not reflect any 
willingness to cede real institutional power or true accountability. At the macro-level, there is little 
indication that the institutions are interested in abandoning or accounting for their prerogatives. 
Governments never do; that is the purpose of constitutions – and many would say it is the purpose 
too of trans-national governance. Most obviously, in the area of financial regulation and supervision, 
where the decision-making has long attracted criticism on the ground of lack of transparency and 
accountability,21 the recent wave of economic crises has facilitated a serious slide back to 
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unaccountable governance in the EU. To quote an earlier Editorial in this Journal,22 authority leached 
from national and regional institutions has been re-allocated to: 
institutions whose legitimacy is indirectly democratic (to be pedantic, whose ‘chain’ of 
democratic legitimacy is long, with many links) while the competencies and authority of both 
the European Parliament and of national parliaments (with the rather more formal than 
substantive exception of some national parliaments…) have largely stalled. 
A clutch of new EU agencies, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
established to regulate the important insurance, securities and banking industries, has for the first 
time been endowed with a measure of real regulatory power such as is possessed by true regulatory 
agencies in the far more restrictive constitutional framework of the United States of America.23 This 
is in any event an area of limited legal accountability, where courts are inclined to defer to economic 
expertise. Faced with the dubiously legal delegation of an impressive raft of discretionary powers in 
risky areas of economic activity, the Court of Justice has unsurprisingly been only too glad to defer.24 
Thus the effect of the economic crisis has been to accentuate a slide towards authoritarian 
government that can only provoke new questions about European constitutional legitimacy.  
The European Central Bank, probably the most powerful of these independent financial agencies, is 
not noted for transparency. The European Ombudsman website lists five complaints regarding the 
European Central Bank, though only one, which concerns the Bank’s refusal to release to a journalist  
a letter from its then President Jean Claude Trichet to the Irish Finance Minister concerning the 
Greek crisis, is as yet reported. Notwithstanding her ruling that the European Central Bank had been 
entitled in 2010 to withhold the letter, the Ombudsman tried four years later to negotiate a friendly 
settlement. The Council of the European Central Bank failed to react. Ms O’Reilly expressed herself 
unconvinced by their explanations and regretted that the Bank had ‘wasted an opportunity to apply 
the principle that, in a democracy, transparency should be the rule and secrecy the exception’.25 In a 
strictly limited sense, a pedant might call this a victory for accountability, as the European Central 
Bank was at least forced to give reasons for its refusal to disclose; in the wider and more generous 
sense of the term used by Ms O’Reilly, however, it was not. 
Largely conducted in an atmosphere of deep secrecy, the recent US-EU negotiations for the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have provoked a similar struggle; both the 
European Ombudsman and the European Parliament have had to fight for transparency and the 
latter has struggled to maintain its prerogatives. Only after lengthy negotiations did the European 
Parliament achieve the right for its trade committee to access the full negotiating texts and then 
only to view them in dedicated reading rooms. The public has had to resort to political 
demonstrations. But the European Ombudsman once again intervened via the medium of an own 
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initiative, holding a public consultation with a view, as she said, to creating a forum for public 
participation and upholding the democratic right to transparency and public participation. To put 
this differently the European Ombudsman acted as ‘public advocate’, using her investigatory 
procedure as a conduit for public opinion and passing the views expressed with some of her own 
ideas to the Commission.26 While praising the Commission for its ‘real efforts’ to make the TTIP 
negotiations more transparent, Ms O’Reilly insisted that much more needed to be done. She called 
on the Commission to establish ‘a comprehensive list of public and non-public TTIP documents’ and 
for ‘greater proactivity concerning the publication of documents, including agendas and minutes of 
meetings with lobbyists’; furthermore,  she called on the EU executive authorities  ‘to tell the US that 
it had to justify any American request to not disclose a document’. 27 A dog that can bite but only in 
the context of micro-management. 
Why do our rulers seek so often to side-step the democratic processes to which the Treaties commit 
them? The ardent protestation of Declaration 17 attached to the Maastricht Treaty that 
‘Transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions 
and the public’s confidence in the administration’ was inserted by the Treaty-makers. So too was the 
direction in Article 11(2) of the TEU inserted at Lisbon that the institutions ‘shall maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’. Yet manifestly 
the spirit of these injunctions is not being respected. Why again, in a glasshouse age, are the EU 
institutions so hostile to ‘government in the sunshine’? Why, in the age of popular democracy, does 
the Council cling so avidly to its model of lawmaking as non-participatory diplomatic negotiation? 
The standard political response, that Council members are directly responsible to their electorates, 
is fairy-tale rather than fiction.28 To reiterate, these are not idle questions and the fate of the Union 
may depend on the answers. 
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